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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Criminal Law and Procedure-Search and Seizure- STANDING TO
INVOKE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE NARROWED BY NEW USE OF
PRIVACY EXPECTATION STANDARD
Rakas v. Illinois,
99 S. Ct. 421 (1978)
Like a gardener pruning an unruly shrub, the Supreme
Court recently trimmed twenty years of growth from the contro-
versial fourth amendment exclusionary rule.' Since 1960, criminal
defendants have successfully invoked the protection of the rule
upon a showing that they were "legitimately on premises" where
an improper search took place.2  In Rakas v. Illinois,3 however,
the Court has sharply limited the categories of persons who may
invoke fourth amendment protection. 4  The Court abandoned
the "legitimately on premises" standard and applied instead a test
that requires the defendant to show a "legitimate expectation of
privacy." 5 This Note examines the theoretical coherence and
practical implications of Rakas, and argues that the Court should
return to the "legitimately on premises" standard.
The exclusionary rule, simply stated, bars the use of the fruits of an improper police
search as evidence in a criminal prosecution. See note 8 infra.
2 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960). Jones involved alternative hold-
ings: in addition to the "legitimately on premises" standard, the Court established the "au-
tomatic standing" rule. This rule grants standing to seek suppression where possession of
the evidence is an essential element of the crime charged; it thus rescues defendants from
the dilemma of having to claim possession to establish standing at a suppression hearing
and then being faced with the admission at trial. Id. at 264-65. The importance of the
"automatic standing" rule was reduced by Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968),
which held that the prosecution could not use the defendant's suppression hearing tes-
timony against him at trial. "Automatic standing" was not at issue in Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S.
Ct. 421 (1978), because the defendants were charged with armed robbery, not illegal
weapons possession. The Court noted that it had "not yet had occasion to decide whether
the automatic standing rule of Jones survives our decision in Simmons." Id. at 426 n.4.
3 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
" Id. at 429-33. Prior cases had limited the application of the exclusionary rule without
restricting the categories of persons who could invoke fourth amendment protection. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (rule does not require federal habeas corpus
relief where defendant had opportunity to fully and fairly litigate fourth amendment claim
in state court); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974) (rule does not pre-
clude questions, in grand jury proceedings, based on illegally obtained evidence); Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (prosecution can sometimes use illegally seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant). In addition, see note 38 infra
for a discussion of the "automobile exception" to that rule.
5 99 S. Ct. at 433.
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1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The fourth amendment guarantees the "right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." 6  Beginning with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Weeks v. United States,7 federal courts
have sought to implement this protection by barring the use at
trial of evidence acquired through violations of the defendant's
fourth amendment rights.8 The rationale for this "exclusionary
rule" is simple: police will not engage in unconstitutional searches
and seizures if the product of such misconduct is inadmissible in
court. 9 Critics of the rule, however, often echo Justice (then
Judge) Cardozo's lament that the "criminal [goes] free because the
6 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8 The exclusionary rule was first applied in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), to suppress evidence discovered in an improper search. The Weeks Court warned
that if the prosecution can offer evidence obtained through illegal searches, "the protection
of the Fourth Amendment declaring [the defendant's] right to be secure against such
searches is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution." Id. at 393. Weeks held only that the exclusionary rule
barred the use of evidence obtained illegally by federal officials against criminal defendants
in federal courts. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-33 (1949), the Court held that,
while the fourteenth amendment fully incorporated the fourth amendment, states need not
adopt a similar rule. The Court reversed itself in 1961, however, and mandated state adop-
tion of the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Mapp Court
noted that states had been unable to develop any satisfactory alternative remedy for fourth
amendment violations, and observed that many states had adopted the exclusionary rule on
their own initiative. Id. at 651-52. The Court observed in Rakas that "the exclusionary rule
is an attempt to effectuate the guaranties of the Fourth Amendment." 99 S. Ct. at 425.
The rule is not "a personal constitutional right," but a court-devised means of protecting
fourth amendment rights. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). For an
analysis of the theoretical foundations of the court-devised rule, see Monaghan, The Su-
preme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3-10
(1975).
9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (rule promotes "honest law enforcement"
and 'judicial integrity"); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (rule's purpose
"is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard it").
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constable has blundered." 10 Moreover, they contend that civil ac-
tions for damages provide a more effective and less costly means
of discouraging police misconduct."
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of standing to
invoke the exclusionary rule in Olmstead v. United States.' 2 Over a
strong dissent by Justice Brandeis,' 13 the Court tied fourth
amendment protection to the property interest asserted by the
aggrieved party.14  Unless the defendant could claim such an in-
10 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657
(1926). See also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). The Irvine plurality observed that
"[r]ejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official, while it may,
and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant." Id. at 136.
Chief Justice Burger has labeled the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule
"hardly more than a wistful dream," calling it "conceptually sterile and practically in-
effective." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 415 (1971) (dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.). The rule fails, Chief Justice Burger
contends, because police do not understand court rulings defining the proper standard of
conduct, prosecutors have no direct control over police, and no direct sanction is imposed
on the offending officer. Id. at 416-17.
11 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), the Court held that a private citizen was "entitled to recover money damages for
any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the [Fourth] Amend-
ment." Id. at 397. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, urged replacement of the exclusionary
rule with a more "workable remedy" for such violations; he predicted that private tort
actions against individual officials would not work because jurors "may well refuse to
penalize a police officer at the behest of a person they believe to be a 'criminal.' "Id. at 422
(dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.). The Chief Justice proposed a legislatively created system
by which injured parties could sue the federal government directly in federal tribunals. Id.
at 422-24 (dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.).
Chief Justice Burger's prediction was accurate; the Bivens remedy has'proven to be
ineffective. See Note, "Damages or Nothing"-The Efficacy of the Bivens-T)pe Remedy, 64 COR-
NELL L. REv. 667 (1979).
12 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
13 The Bill of Rights, Justice Brandeis said, "conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of
the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478 (dissenting opinion, Brandeis, J.).
14 The Court held that the use of telephone wiretaps did not violate the defendant's
fourth amendment rights because there had been no trespass against his person or prop-
erty. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, said that a defendant's rights were not
violated "unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his
house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure." Id. at 466. Lower courts followed
the Olmstead majority's position for nearly thirty years. See, e.g., Gaskins v. United States,
218 F.2d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (defendant has no standing to seek suppres-
sion of results of warrantless search where she was "merely a guest" in another's apart-
ment); In re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924, 925 (2d Cir. 1942) (per curiam) ("one who has no




terest in the seized object or in the searched premises, he had no
standing to challenge the police search that produced the object.
Olrnstead's narrow view of standing underwent dramatic ex-
pansion in 1960. In Jones v. United States,15 the Court held that
"anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may chal-
lenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits
are proposed to be used against him." 16 The lower court had
reasoned that, because Jones was a "guest" or "invitee" in a
friend's apartment, he had no right to object to the introduction
into evidence of drugs seized in a warrantless search of the
apartment.17 The Court reversed, warning against importing
"subtle distinctions ... of private property law" into the discussion
of constitutionally protected rights.' 8 Such historical distinctions
were "often only of gossamer strength" and were frequently out-
dated concepts within property law itself. 9 Rather than struggle
with such arcane distinctions, the Court drew a line between those
whose presence on the searched premises was "legitimate" and
those whose presence was "wrongful."2 0
In Katz v. United States,2' however, the Court faced a fact situ-
ation in which the "legitimately on premises" test offered little
guidance. Police had tapped a public telephone booth, without a
warrant, to record defendant's bookmaking transactions. The
prosecution and the defendant disputed whether the telephone
booth was a "constitutionally protected area" such as a home, of-
fice, or friend's apartment.2 2 The Court found no "talismanic
solution to every Fourth Amendment problem" in abstract
characterizations of the area searched; 23 rather, the Court looked
to the defendant's expectation of privacy. The Court declared that
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 24 By
15 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
16 Id. at 267.
17 Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1958), vacated and remanded, 362
U.S. 257 (1960).
18 362 U.S. at 266.
19 Id.
20 "This would of course not avail those who, by virtue of their wrongful presence,
cannot invoke the privacy of the premises searched." Id. at 267.
21 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22 Id. at 349-5 1.
23 Id. at 351 n.9.
24 Id. at 351-52.
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closing the door to the telephone booth, Katz had shown an inten-
tion to keep his conversations private.
Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, expressed the question of
fourth amendment protection as a two-stage analysis. First, the
defendant must show "an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy." 25 Second, that expectation must be reasonable by the
objective standards of society, and "place" is relevant to this
determination.26  For instance, -a person generally has reason-
able expectation of privacy in his home or an enclosed telephone
booth, but not in an open field. 27  The Court, in reaffirming Katz
in later decisions, used Justice Harlan's terminology.28
II
RAKAS V. ILLINOIS
On the night of February 4, 1975, police received a report of
a robbery at a clothing store in Bourbonnais, Illinois. A short time
later, they stopped an automobile matching the description of the
get-away car and ordered the occupants-the woman owner and
driver, and one female and two male passengers-to get out. An
immediate, warrantless search of the car revealed a box of rifle
shells in the locked glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle
under the front seat. The two male passengers, Frank Rakas and
Lonnie King, were eventually convicted of armed robbery. The
Illinois courts denied defendants' motion to suppress the rifle and
shells obtained in the search. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected the Jones
standard of "legitimate presence" on the searched premises as
"too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment
rights."29  He restricted Jones to its facts, asserting that it "merely
stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a
25 Id. at 361 (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.).
26 Id. (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.).
27 Id. at 360-61 (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.).
28 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (defendant had standing to seek
suppression of evidence because his office was a place where he had "reasonable expecta-
tion of freedom from goverment intrusion"); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227
(1972) (dictum) (remanded for determination of whether defendant had a "reasonable ex-
pectation" of freedom from search). In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the
Court used the catch phrase "legitimate expectations of privacy" in holding that a polic
search of a locked footlocker was a violation of the defendants' fourth amendment rights.
Id. at 7.
29 99 S. Ct. 421, 429 (1978).
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legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so
that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable
governmental intrusion into that place." 30  In place of the Jones
standard. Justice Rehnquist substituted a test that requires defen-
dants to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched
area.3 1  In order to determine whether a privacy expectation is
legitimate, courts must consider either "concepts of real or per-
sonal property law" or "understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society."' 32 One relevant consideration, for exam-
ple, is the degree of access which the defendant had to the
searched area.33 Thus, Justice Rehnquist implied, the Rakas de-
fendants would have been in a stronger position if they had pos-
sessed keys to the locked glove compartment. 34  Courts should
also consider whether the defendant could exclude others from
the searched area, he said, observing that this was "[o]ne of the
main rights attaching to property." 35
At first glance, Justice Rehnquist's opinion seems to be a
straightforward application of Katz. Closer inspection reveals that
despite Justice Rehnquist's adoption of the Katz "expectation of
privacy" language, the standard he applied in Rakas is quite
different. By focusing on possessory and property interests, Jus-
tice Rehnquist took a position much more restrictive than that of
Justice Harlan in his Katz concurrence. Justice Harlan asked only
whether the defendant's expectation of privacy was reasonable.
Justice Rehnquist, however, insisted that the defendant must have
a "legally sufficient interest" in the searched premises or seized
property, 36 cutting away fourth amendment protection from
many persons protected by Jones.
The facts of Rakas did not force the Court to abandon Jones.
As Justice Rehnquist noted, an automobile by its very nature car-
ries with it a decreased expectation of privacy. 37 The Court
could have limited its discussion to the so-called "automobile ex-
3o Id. at 430.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 430-31 n.12. Justice Rehnquist did not explain what constitutes a socially rec-
ognized "understanding" for fourth amendment purposes but focused instead on
property-related factors.
33 Id. at 433.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 431 n.12.
36 Id. at 430. Justice Rebnquist used the term in discussing how the facts ofJones would
be handled under the Rakas test.
37 Id. at 433.
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ception."3 8  The majority, however, expressed discomfort with a
generous reading of fourth amendment standing and chose to at-
tack Jones broadly. 39
Justice White's argument for the four dissenting justices, that
the majority's new standard of legitimate expectation of privacy
"protects property, not people," 40 is accurate. Rakas does not re-
turn to pre-Jones distinctions based on arcane property law labels,
but it does exalt the possession, control and ownership of prop-
erty.
By cutting back on the categories of persons who can invoke
fourth amendment protection, the Rakas Court has robbed the
exclusionary rule of much of its deterrent effect. Under the Jones
standard, police knew that any person on the searched premises
in any capacity which was not "wrongful" could object to the use
against him of any improperly seized evidence. Neither the Katz
majority nor Justice Harlan questioned the general soundness of
this proposition. 41  With such a high probability that a person on
the premises would have standing to object, police had little incen-
tive to conduct an improper search. Rakas tells police that persons
who are legitimately on the searched premises and who may have
reasonably expected privacy have no fourth amendment rights if
they lack some property interest. When more than one person is
present, or when police know that the person present is not the
owner, they may be tempted to conduct an illegal search in the
belief that they will still be able to use the seized material as evi-
dence. 4 2
38 Under the "automobile exception," the Court has held that warrantless searches of
automobiles are permissible under circumstances that would make searches of other areas
unreasonable. A major justification for this exception is the automobile's mobile nature. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147-53 (1925). Also, an automobile's openness to
public view, its travel on public roads, and regulation by the government decrease its oc-
cupant's expectation of privacy. Moreover, because of frequent traffic and safety inspec-
tions and impoundment of automobiles for traffic and parking violations, this decreased
privacy protection may also extend to items not in general view. See South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-76 (1975).
39 Justice Rehnquist noted that "[e]ach time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a
substantial cost" in loss of evidence and observed that "misgivings as to the benefit of
enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly considered when
deciding whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations." 99 S. Ct. at
427.
40 Id. at 437, 443 (dissenting opinion, White, J.). Justices Brennan, Marshall and Ste-
vens joined White.
41 See notes 21-27 and accompanying text supra.
42 Justice White noted this danger in connection with automobiles, but the logic also
applies to searches of other areas. 99 S. Ct. at 444 (dissenting opinion, White, J.).
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Not only does Rakas open the door to police abuses, but it
also confuses those police who attempt to conscientiously follow
the law. The Rakas standard requires police to guess what type of
interest a person has in an object or premises -something that is
virtually impossible to know without detailed inquiry. As Justice
White noted, "[o]nly rarely will police know whether one private
party has or has not been granted a sufficient possessory or other
interest by another private party." 43  Justice Rehnquist argued
that the Jones test had led to conflicting holdings among courts
and had failed to establish a "bright line" of guidance. 44  These
differences, however, occurred along the fringes of the definition
of "premises" or in cases where Jones was not really applicable
because a "premises" as such was not involved. 45  In its general
street-level application, Jones provided a wide area of clear guid-
ance. Rakas offers virtually none.
CONCLUSION
The Rakas majority, while ostensibly following the language
of Katz, radically altered the concept of "expectation of privacy,"
tying it to a narrow range of property-related interests. By using
this concept to attack Jones, the Rakas Court has sharply limited
the categories of persons who can invoke fourth amendment pro-
tection against police searches. Rakas has increased the possibility
of police abuses and at the same time has created problems for
police wishing to comply with constitutional requirements. It is a
dangerous position and should be abandoned.
Philip Hiatt Dixon
43 Id. at 443 (dissenting opinion, White, J.). Chief Justice Burger, who joined in the
Rakas majority, had earlier observed that police officers "do not have the time, inclination,
or training to read and grasp the nuances of the appellate opinions that ultinately define
the standards of conduct they are to follow." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 417 (dissenting opinion, Burger, C. J.). Justice
White's criticsm in Rakas goes deeper than this. He argues that even if police memorized
all the relevant appellate opinions, they still could not apply the Rakas standard because
they are unable to tell what interest a person has in a particular item or property.
44 Id. at 431 n.13.
45 Id. Justice Rehnquist noted different results among circuits regarding searches of
third persons' bedrooms, purses, and desks, and searches of the premises when the
defendant was absent. These decisions, however, involved how far "presence" could be
stretched, not whether a defendant in the room or other immediate area of the search
could object to a warrantless search of that area. Justice Rehnquist conceded that "with few
exceptions, lower courts have literally applied this language from Jones and have held that
anyone legitimately on premises at the time of the search may contest its legality." Id. at
429-30 n.10.
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